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Abstract:  Animal vigilance is concerned with the monitoring of potential threats caused by 
predators and conspecifics. Researchers have argued that threats are part of a landscape of 
fear tracking the level of risk posed by predators and conspecifics. Vigilance, which is expected 
to vary with the level of risk, could thus be used as a measure of fear. Here, I explore the 
relationship between vigilance and fear caused by predators and conspecifics. The joint 
occurrence of vigilance and other physiological responses to fear, such as increased heart rate 
and stress hormone release, would bolster the idea that vigilance can be a useful marker of 
fear. While there is some support for a positive relationship between vigilance and 
physiological correlates of fear, a common theme in much of the empirical research is that 
vigilance and physiological correlates of fear are often uncoupled. Uncoupling can arise for 
several reasons. In particular, vigilance is not always a sensitive or specific marker of the 
internal state of vigilance. Vigilance might occur in animals who do not appear overtly vigilant 
or conversely an animal might appear vigilant without necessarily maintaining a state of 
vigilance. Animals in a fearful state might also be unable to allocate time to vigilance if they 
are too hungry. Vigilant animals might not show physiological responses associated with fear 
if they become desensitized to threats. For all these reasons, inferring fear from vigilance is 
fraught with ambiguity.  
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 The semipalmated sandpiper (Calidris pusilla) is a small North American shorebird 
who breeds in the Canadian arctic and winters along coastal South America (Hicklin & Gratto-
Trevor, 2010). The Bay of Fundy, in eastern Canada, serves as a major stopover area during 
fall migration. Large sandpiper flocks forage on the Bay’s mudflats for small invertebrates 
and other minute food items (Gerwing, Kim, Hamilton, Barbeau, & Addison, 2016). When the 
tide covers the mudflats, sandpipers gather on the shore to rest in flocks that can exceed 
250,000 birds (Sprague, Hamilton, & Diamond, 2008) (Figure 1). Rising tides force 
sandpipers to forage and rest close to the shore where they are vulnerable to surprise attacks 
by peregrine falcons (Falco peregrinus) and other raptors (D. Dekker, I. Dekker, Christie, & 
Ydenberg, 2011). Falcons launch surprise attacks from the wooded cover near shore; they fly 
low over the mudflats using vegetation cover to mask their rapid approaches (Beauchamp, 
2016c). Small sandpipers cannot confront the much larger falcons. Instead, they rely on 
vigilance to detect attacks before it is too late to escape. Thousands of eyes in a flock thus 
scan the sky for signs of approaching falcons. Upon detection of a threat, the sandpipers 
cluster into a tight, swerving ball that protects the birds by making it more difficult for the 
falcons to isolate one prey (Leger & Nelson, 1982).  
 
 
Figure 1. Large flock of semipalmated sandpipers roosting on the shore. 
 
Falcons affect sandpipers in direct and indirect ways. The lethal effect of predation is 
obviously one direct consequence for the unlucky ones. However, sandpipers also adjust their 
behaviour to reduce the chances of capture, thus opening the door for indirect effects of 
predation (Lima, 1998). For instance, sandpipers interrupt their activities to scan the 
surroundings for signs of danger. Such vigilance comes at a cost, as it curtails essential 
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behaviour such as foraging and resting. While joining other foraging sandpipers allows 
individuals to reduce the chances that falcons approach undetected, it also increases 
competition between individuals (Beauchamp, 2007, 2012). These various indirect costs of 
predation might translate into a slower rate of fat deposition during stopover, perhaps 
increasing the length of the migration, and eventually reducing the odds of survival 
(Ydenberg, Butler, Lank, Smith, & Ireland, 2004).  
Foraging in large flocks, sandpipers also face another type of threat, namely, one 
another. Aggressive displacement from a resource patch is common in these birds 
(Beauchamp, 2014b). One sandpiper will make a run at a nearby companion, often coming 
from behind to reduce the chances of being detected, and bump into the other bird to usurp 
the food patch. Aggressive displacement is less likely with longer runs, suggesting that 
investment in vigilance might be useful to detect these attacks early (Beauchamp, 2016a).  
Are sandpipers anxious about predation threats or aggressive displacements? Are 
they fearful? Are they conscious of fear? While these answers would be obvious to us if we 
faced the prospect of ambush attacks by lions at a watering hole in the African savannah, it is 
not so clear when we try to address these issues in a different species. Non-human animals 
cannot provide reports about their feelings. Because invasive procedures to determine the 
recruitment of brain circuits are not always an option or even possible in the field, how is it 
possible to infer fear in animals? Behavioural patterns and other physiological adjustments 
triggered by the activation of brain circuits involved in the fear state could provide an indirect 
way of assessing fear. In sandpipers, for instance, looking for threats often leads to higher 
vigilance, which is betrayed by head cocks. Vigilance in general is relatively easy to document 
in the field. My aim here is to examine what vigilance can tell us about fear, not so much about 
the feeling of fear but rather about fear as an emotional state (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014; 
Gross & Canteras, 2012), which includes measurable physiological and behavioural 
correlates. In the first part, I provide a brief introduction to the topic of vigilance in animals. 
I then examine the evidence for a state of fear in animals and its relationship with threats 
from predators and competitors. 
 
2. What is vigilance? 
 
 As defined in a dictionary, vigilance relates to the state or the action of keeping careful 
watch for potential danger. This is certainly the meaning that we attach to this word in a 
saying like “vigilance is of the essence.” In the scientific literature concerned with humans, 
vigilance often relates to the ability to detect stimuli of interest in the environment, which 
might only bear a loose connection with danger (Pattyn, Neyt, Henderickx, & Soetens, 2008). 
This would be the case in studies, say, investigating factors that affect the ability to maintain 
concentration during tedious monitoring tasks on a computer screen. In the scientific 
literature dealing with the behaviour of non-human animals, vigilance relates to the 
monitoring of threats be they caused by predators or conspecifics (Beauchamp, 2015) (Box 
1). This is similar to the definition used by psychologists except that they use the label “risk 
assessment” to describe the behavioural patterns associated with the detection of threats or 
the increased watchfulness that follows the detection of such threats (D. C. Blanchard, 
Griebel, Pobbe, & R. J. Blanchard, 2011).  
Vigilance can be a behaviour or a state, and obviously most field studies have focused 
on documenting external markers of vigilance such as head position. For example, vigilant 
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animals will raise their heads from the ground to scan the surroundings. An internal state of 
vigilance could be inferred using empirical data about the ability to detect threatening stimuli 
(Dimond & Lazarus, 1974), but there has been little work in that direction. One problem of 
using external markers to infer vigilance is that animals could be in a vigilant state (thus able 
to detect threats) without showing clearly observable signs of vigilance. This would be the 
case, say, for rats looking down at food but still able to scan the area above their heads using 
their lateral eyes (Wallace et al., 2013). Conversely, an animal could be in a non-vigilant state 
(unable to detect threats) and yet adopt a vigilant posture. For instance, individuals who are 
seemingly vigilant for threats can actually be searching for food. Another issue is that 
vigilance is difficult to measure in species such as insects and fish where external signs of 
vigilance are not obvious (to us).  
 
 
Box 1. Glossary 
Antipredator vigilance: Monitoring of threats related to predators. 
Fear: For ecologists, fear represents what animals probably experience when facing threats 
by predators and conspecifics. In humans, fear is typically viewed as the conscious feeling 
that arises when threatened. More generally, fear can be viewed as a state that links 
threatening stimuli to the set of responses to such threats including physiological and 
behavioural changes.   
Landscape of fear: Expression coined by ecologists to indicate that the risk posed by 
predators can vary both in time and in space in the habitat of an animal. 
Pre-emptive vigilance: Vigilance to detect signs of predator activity or signs that neighbors 
are threatening before they actually launch their attacks. 
Reactive vigilance: Vigilance aimed at present threats. 
Social vigilance: Monitoring of threats related to conspecifics. 
Threat: Any cue that signals a potential attack.  
Vigilance: Monitoring of potential or actual threats using different sensory modes (e.g., 
visual, auditory). Typically, vigilance involves the cessation of ongoing activities to monitor 
the surroundings for danger. This monitoring can involve several behavioural patterns 
depending on the species, including movements of the head to bring different areas into 
visual focus, sniffing, and reorientation of the ears.  
 
 In addition to potentially low sensitivity and specificity (Figure 2), it is also not always 
easy to detect the target of vigilance. Animals can maintain vigilance to detect predators, the 
so-called antipredator vigilance, or to detect potentially aggressive conspecifics, the so-called 
social vigilance (Hall, 1960) (Box 1). Animals can use the same posture for both types of 
vigilance, making it hard to distinguish between the two. In animals with forward-facing eyes, 
the direction of the gaze could be used to infer the target of vigilance: if the animal looks away 
from the group, then vigilance is probably aimed at predators, while glances at nearby 
conspecifics probably betray social vigilance (Favreau, Goldizen, & Pays, 2010). 
The hallmark of vigilance is that it is costly to perform (Lima & Dill, 1990). As in the 
sandpiper example above, time spent vigilant detracts from the ability to obtain food or to 
rest, which can translate into poorer future reproductive success. To mitigate such costs, 
competing activities can overlap. For instance, vigilance can be maintained during food 
processing, thus reducing the time during which no food can be obtained (Cowlishaw et al., 
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2004). But even then, performing two activities at the same time might lead to suboptimal 
detection or food processing.  
In general, it is fair to infer a higher level of risk from predators or from conspecifics 
when animals spend more time vigilant. Here are some examples with sandpipers. Falcons 
pose a greater threat when they can launch their attacks closer to shore because sandpipers 
have less time to detect and react to their fast approaches. Therefore, sandpipers devote more 
time to antipredator vigilance when they are closer to shore (Beauchamp, 2014a). Similarly, 
conspecifics pose a greater threat when they are closer, and sandpipers are more vigilant 
when neighbours are closer (Beauchamp, 2016b).  
 Vigilance can be pre-emptive or reactive. During pre-emptive vigilance, animals 
maintain vigilance to detect signs of predator activity or signs that neighbors are threatening 
before they actually launch their attacks. Reactive vigilance is concerned with the actual 
monitoring of threatening predators or conspecifics. Reactive vigilance provides the time 
necessary to assess the level of threat caused by a predator or a conspecific, and to choose a 
proper course of action such as fleeing or fighting. Some researchers propose that fear is 
associated with imminent threats and thus with reactive vigilance, while pre-emptive 
vigilance might be associated with anxiety because the threat is not imminent (Boissy, 1995; 
Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001). This classification scheme for vigilance is similar to the one 
that psychologists use to distinguish between potential, distal, and more proximal threats (R. 
J. Blanchard, Flannelly, & D. C. Blanchard, 1986; Fanselow & Lester, 1988; Mobbs, Hagan, 
Dalgleish, Silston, & Prévost, 2015).  
 Sociality has emerged as a key factor influencing both social and antipredator 
vigilance. Opportunities for competition typically increase with group size, and the 
expectation is that social vigilance increases with group size (Beauchamp, 2001; Treves, 
1999). By contrast, the need for antipredator vigilance is expected to decrease in larger 
groups. This is because more eyes and ears are available to scan the surroundings for signs 
of danger, which enables individuals to relax their own vigilance at no increased risk to 
themselves (Pulliam, 1973). In addition, the risk of capture of any individual is diluted by the 
presence of more targets for the predator in a large group (Bertram, 1978). Better detection 
and risk dilution are the two main factors that allow antipredator vigilance to decrease in 
larger groups (Roberts, 1996).  
To ensure that they are not left behind during an attack, individuals who have not 
detected a threat by themselves must be able to react rapidly to signs of alarm provided by 
neighbours (Lima, 1995). This collective detection implies that individuals can quickly assess 
cues or signals provided by alarmed neighbours. Signals like alarm calls are easy to detect 
and allow fast collective detection. Indirect cues of alarm are also available such as noisy 
takeoffs (Cresswell, Hilton, & Ruxton, 2000; Hingee & Magrath, 2009) or interruptions in 
feeding suggesting that a threat is currently monitored (Pereira, Cruz, Lima, & Moita, 2012). 
Cues that are familiar to us like facial expressions of fear can be recognized by some animals 
(Tate, Fischer, Leigh, & Kendrick, 2006).  
 It was long thought that animals adjusted their vigilance independently from one 
another (Pulliam, 1973), but recent work suggests that they actually pay attention to the 
vigilance of their neighbours (e.g., Beauchamp, 2009; Ge, Beauchamp, & Li, 2011; Pays et al., 
2007; Podgórski et al., 2016). This can be useful when animals need to coordinate or 
synchronize their vigilance. Coordination ensures that a more constant level of vigilance is 
maintained at the group level, and it implies that animals avoid being vigilant when others 
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are (Bednekoff, 2015; Fernández-Juricic, Kerr, Bednekoff, & Stephens, 2004). 
Synchronization occurs when individuals in the group tend to become vigilant at the same 
time. Coordination and synchronization of vigilance imply that animals can recognize that 




Figure 2. Relationship between observable behaviour and the internal state of vigilance. 
When an animal is able to detect threats because the brain is responsive to such threats, 
observable behaviour might or might not betray the internal state, leading to errors of type I 
when the animal is not internally vigilant but shows external signs of vigilance (e.g., vigilance 
is directed at other targets), or to errors of type II when the animal is internally vigilant but 
shows no obvious signs of vigilance (e.g., misidentification of vigilance at the behavioural 
level).  
 
Some researchers have suggested using vigilance as a measure of fear (Welp, Rushen, 
Kramer, Festa-Bianchet, & de Passillé, 2004) or more generally as an indicator of welfare 
(Mason & Veasey, 2010). Ecologists also propose that fear underlies predation risk 
(Blumstein, 2006; Brown, Laundré, & Gurung, 1999; Gallagher, Creel, Wilson, & Cooke, 2017; 
Gil, Emberts, Jones, & St. Mary, 2017; LaManna & Martin, 2016; Laundré, Hernandez, & 
Altendorf, 2001; Laundré, Hernandez, & Ripple, 2010; Preisser, Bolnick, & Benard, 2005; 
Stankowich & Blumstein, 2005), which makes a strong case for using vigilance as a measure 
of fear because of its strong association with the level of perceived risk. Measurements of 
vigilance are relatively easy to make and non-invasive, rendering them suitable for a quick 
evaluation of internal states. The extent to which fear can be inferred from vigilance is 
explored below.  
 




3. Relationship between vigilance and fear 
 
 In its everyday meaning, “fear” is the conscious feeling that arises when facing a threat 
(Box 1). For ecologists, fear represents what animals probably experience when facing 
threats by predators and conspecifics. The emphasis is on “probably” because it is not clear 
whether non-human animals experience feelings of fear just as humans do. More generally, 
fear can be viewed as an internal state that links threatening stimuli to the set of responses 
to avoid such threats including physiological and behavioural changes (Adolphs, 2013). 
These responses include more vigilance and a host of physiological responses including the 
release of stress hormones and an increase in heart rate. Neuroscientists have identified 
neural circuits in the brains of mammals that are involved in the production of responses to 
threats (Gross & Canteras, 2012; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004; 
Mobbs et al., 2015; Pellman & Kim, 2016). Stimulation of these brain areas produces 
behavioural and physiological responses that are similar to those observed when animals 
face a threat. In addition, lesions to these brain areas greatly impair the production of these 
responses.   
That vigilance betrays fear is often posited in the literature especially when it comes 
to antipredator vigilance (Blumstein, 2006; Brown et al., 1999; Gallagher et al., 2017; Laundré 
et al., 2001; Laundré et al., 2010; Stankowich & Blumstein, 2005). Fear in this case is thought 
to reflect predation risk. The “landscape of fear,” for instance, describes how fear varies both 
in space and in time in the habitat where prey animals live. The distance between sandpipers 
and obstructive cover, from which falcons launch their attacks, is one example of a landscape 
feature associated with predation risk and thus (presumably) fear. Notice that a more 
objective term could be used to describe variation in risk in a habitat such as “landscape of 
risk or danger.” I think it is fair to say that in most such cases, fear is assumed rather than 
measured.  
The leap in logic here is that a higher predation risk translates into more fear, from 
which we would expect behavioural and other adjustments to reduce the chances of 
predation. This leap to the mental realm is rather atypical of students of animal behaviour, 
but can be explained by the continuity argument suggesting that animals, just like us, 
probably experience emotions (Bekoff, 2007), and that fear must be the emotion driving 
reactions to predators (and presumably conspecifics) such as vigilance and fleeing.  
It has been argued that because fear cannot be easily measured, we cannot really infer 
that animals are in a state of fear and certainly not imply that animals are feeling fearful 
(LeDoux, 2014). Just consider the following example to illustrate the opposing viewpoints. 
Several studies have shown that a higher risk of predation can affect reproduction (Clinchy, 
Sheriff, & Zanette, 2013; Hawlena & Schmitz, 2010). One possible interpretation for this 
association is that predation risk causes fear and anxiety, and the resulting physiological 
consequences eventually affect reproduction. An alternative interpretation is that the stress 
is caused by other factors such as the low food intake that resulted from behavioural 
adjustments to higher risk, with no implication for fear at all (Creel, Winnie, & Christianson, 
2009).  
 For ecologists, vigilance and other measures such as the distance at which animals flee 
from a threat (Cooper & Blumstein, 2015), represent an external marker of fear whose level 
tracks predation risk in a habitat. The link between predation risk and vigilance is so strong 
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that there can be little doubt that vigilance can be a very good marker of predation risk. 
Whether we accept vigilance as a marker of fear remains an open question.  
How can we make a case for using vigilance as a marker for fear rather than simply 
assuming that vigilance betrays fear? In the laboratory, it is possible to infer fear from the 
activation of particular brain circuits involved in the response to threatening stimuli (Gross 
& Canteras, 2012). In the field, however, this option is not possible. One possibility that I 
explore below is to examine whether vigilance tends to co-occur with other measurable 
expressions of fear. Fear is usually associated with the expression of several measurable 
variables including vigilance (D. C. Blanchard et al., 2011), but also other physiological 
correlates such as heart rate and stress hormone release (Adolphs, 2013; Lang et al., 2000). 
If threatening stimuli triggered vigilance along with a host of other physiological responses 
typically associated with fear at the same time, the case for using vigilance as a marker of fear 
would be that much stronger. In the following, I examine the strength of the association 
between physiological correlates of fear and vigilance first in the context of predation and 
then in the context of threats caused by conspecifics. 
 
3.1. Predation risk and fear 
Countless studies have shown that exposure to a predator or to signs of predator activity 
increases levels of vigilance (e.g., Caraco, Martindale, & Pulliam, 1980; Creel, Schuette, & 
Christianson, 2014; Z. Li, Jiang, & Beauchamp, 2009; Périquet et al., 2012). Similarly, exposure 
to a predator or to indirect predator cues (like distance to cover for sandpipers) or to chronic 
predation risk over a longer period of time in a wide variety of taxa — from invertebrates to 
fish, birds, and mammals — can trigger a host of physiological responses compatible with a 
fear response including increased heart rate and release of glucocorticoids or stress 
hormones (Clinchy et al., 2013; Harris & Carr, 2016; Hawlena & Schmitz, 2010). Laboratory 
studies conducted with brief exposure to predators also show numerous endocrine and 
nervous responses (Gross & Canteras, 2012).  
I first examine the association between vigilance and levels of stress hormones before 
considering other physiological correlates of fear. Stress hormone levels can be measured 
directly in the plasma or indirectly using fecal glucocorticoids (fGCs). I distinguish between 
reactive and pre-emptive antipredator vigilance to highlight the distinction between 
responses to immediate risk and responses to long-term exposure to risk, which would 
reflect a more chronic exposition.  
 
3.1.1. Stress hormone production and reactive vigilance 
Gun shots during hunting season provide a good example of an acute stressor that reflects a 
sudden increase in predation risk. Gun shots triggered an increase in fGCs in fallow deer 
(Dama dama) that lasted only a few days. As expected, deer vigilance increased in areas 
where culling occurred (Pecorella, Ferretti, Sforzi, & Macchi, 2016). However, the increase in 
vigilance was reported over a much longer period than the short-lived hormonal response, 
suggesting that higher vigilance persisted despite low levels of stress hormones. A tighter 
coupling between fGCs and vigilance was documented in little bustards (Tetrax tetrax) 
subjected to varying levels of hunting pressure during the same week (Tarjuelo et al., 2015). 
Bustards showed elevated levels of fGCs and higher vigilance on weekends, when hunting 
pressure was highest, but less so before and after. Elevated levels of fGCs can also be 
associated with other factors besides perceived predation risk including food challenges and 
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social instability (Sapolsky, Romero, & Munck, 2000), but the contribution of these factors 
was not explored.  
 Rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) exposed to fox odours showed increased vigilance. 
Parallel changes in serum GCs occurred in confined conditions (Monclús, Rödel, Von Holst, & 
De Miguel, 2005), but not in a more open setting where rabbits could roam more freely 
(Monclús, Rodel, & von Holst, 2006). Other studies failed to document concomitant changes 
in stress hormones and behavioural responses other than vigilance when predation risk 
increased (Cockrem & Silverin, 2002; D. R. Davis & Gabor, 2015; Fonner & Woodley, 2015). 
One possible explanation of these findings is that stress hormone release is less likely when 
threats are more predictable or when animals have more control over the situation (Sapolsky 
et al., 2000). Therefore, stress hormone production and antipredator responses can 
conceivably be uncoupled.  
 
3.1.2. Stress hormone production and pre-emptive vigilance  
The previous section focussed on short-term exposure to predation risk. In other cases, 
animals are exposed to a certain level of predation risk over longer time spans. Vigilance in 
this case serves a pre-emptive purpose, as it is not directed at immediate threats. 
Variation in group size is a convenient way to examine parallel changes in stress 
hormone production and vigilance. As pointed out earlier, animals in smaller groups are 
expected to allocate more time to antipredator vigilance. Higher predation risk in such 
groups, which is expected to translate into more fear, should thus trigger the release of stress 
hormones. In sheep (Ovis aries), cortisol production (a stress hormone) and vigilance peaked 
in the smaller groups (Michelena et al., 2012). Food stress could not be implicated in the 
production of cortisol, given that the amount of food available prevented competition.  
An assumption here is that variation in group size only reflects variation in predation 
risk and thus in fear level. In the smaller groups, however, individuals are also isolated from 
one another. In species with strong bonds between group members, isolation from group 
mates is known to trigger the release of stress hormones (Hawkley, Cole, Capitanio, Norman, 
& Cacioppo, 2012). Even within the confines of a group, the loss of a companion is sufficient 
to release stress hormones (Engh et al., 2006). Similarly, isolated sheep who saw a familiar 
face on a screen released less cortisol (da Costa, Leigh, Man, & Kendrick, 2004).  
Uncoupling between stress hormone release and vigilance is not unusual after 
separation. For instance, ravens (Corvus corax) recently isolated from the flock became less 
vocal and spent more time feeding (less vigilance) over time despite little changes in fGCs 
during the separation period (Munteanu, Stocker, Stöwe, Massen, & Bugnyar, 2017). By 
contrast, the level of cortisol in cows decreased as individuals experienced repeated 
separations despite little changes in vigilance (Müller & Schrader, 2005).  
The above discussion illustrates one of the difficulties in using physiological markers 
to assess the underlying fear state in that such markers are not always specific to fear. In the 
sheep example, separation anxiety as well as increased fear due to greater predation risk in 
smaller groups can both explain the observation that vigilance and stress hormones levels 
are higher in smaller groups. Perhaps one way to tease apart these two distinct phenomena 
is to determine the target of vigilance in smaller groups. Any signs that attention is devoted 
to searching for group mates rather than scanning for predation threats would suggest that 
increased predation risk might not be the only factor that triggers the release of stress 
hormones in smaller groups.  
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 Other studies have taken advantage of natural variation in individual vigilance levels. 
A link between pre-emptive vigilance and fGCs was investigated in meerkats (Suricata 
suricatta). In this species, individuals who excreted more GCs exhibited higher vigilance 
(Voellmy, Goncalves, Barrette, Monfort, & Manser, 2014). It is not clear, however, if other 
factors contributed to this association. For instance, more active individuals who naturally 
excrete more GCs could also be more vigilant (Clary et al., 2014). Similarly, if more vigilant 
individuals are in a poorer state due to more restricted feeding, higher levels of fGCs could 
arise as a consequence of reduced food intake rather than predation risk.  
In species of rodents in the field, it appears that the reverse pattern applies in that 
more vigilant foragers showed lower levels of fGCs (Chmura, Wey, & Blumstein, 2016; Mateo, 
2007). Predictability in predation risk in one of these species was thought to explain low 
levels of fGCs, which would be boosted in the case of an attack (Mateo, 2007). An alternative 
explanation is that chronic exposure desensitized individuals, leading to low levels of stress 
hormone production despite high risk and high vigilance. There could also be costs to 
maintaining a high level of stress hormones over a long period of time, implying that selection 
would favour a quicker return to more normal values despite high risk (Boonstra, 2013).  
Reintroduction of wolves (Canis lupus) to the Greater Yellowstone Park area provides 
a golden opportunity to see how spatial variation in predation risk affects elk (Cervus elaphus) 
reproduction and antipredator behaviour (Laundré et al., 2001). The threat of predation by 
wolves has led to a decrease in reproduction in elk and also to a decrease in population size 
(Creel, Chrisianson, Liley, & Winnie, 2007), which implies that wolves can have a significant 
impact on elk demography. As expected, vigilance in areas with higher predation risk 
substantially increased (Liley & Creel, 2008). However, fGCs did not track the level of 
predation risk measured by the researchers (Creel et al., 2009), suggesting that the 
demographic effects noted above were not associated with the perception of fear, but rather 
with changes in other ecological variables such as food intake. Nevertheless, one would 
expect food shortages to increase levels of fGCs, which was not the case here, casting doubt 
on this interpretation (Boonstra, 2013). These results led the researchers to raise the 
possibility that predation risk can have an impact on vigilance and other variables without 
involving the fear response, which means that elk might not fear wolves after all even though 
they make choices to reduce predation risk.  
Other studies have not reported vigilance but have shown a stronger association 
between GCs and predation risk (Monclús, Palomares, Tablado, Martínez-Fontúrbel, & Palme, 
2009; Sheriff, Krebs, & Boonstra, 2011), although this seems to vary depending on the species 
(Ylönen, Eccard, Jokinen, & Sundell, 2006). Generally, the association between GCs and acute 
or chronic predation risk is not always strong, as only a fraction of studies, from 38% to 77% 
depending on the taxa, have documented an increase in cortisol following exposure to 
predation risk (Harris & Carr, 2016). Several factors might explain uncoupling of predation 
risk and stress hormone levels including individual variation, low predation risk, and 
habituation in the case of chronic exposure (Harris & Carr, 2016). While these factors can 
help us understand why stress hormone release might not be activated, it is still the case that 
predation risk can trigger adjustments in vigilance despite little changes in stress hormone 
release.  
Exposure to anthropogenic sources of disturbances such as traffic, noises or visitors 
has long been known to affect vigilance (see Beauchamp, 2015, for a review). If such 
disturbances cause fear and a subsequent increase in vigilance, one might expect GC levels to 
Animal Sentience 2017.015:  Beauchamp on Fear & Vigilance 
 
 11 
be higher in more disturbed situations. For instance, a clear association has been documented 
between snowmobile activity and fGCs in elk and in wolves (Creel et al., 2002). In free-range 
exhibits with kangaroos (Macropus giganteus), an increase in visitor numbers led to higher 
vigilance but fGCs remained at the same level (Sherwen, Hemsworth, Butler, Fanson, & 
Magrath, 2015). In this particular case, it is possible that visitors were considered a source of 
curiosity rather than disturbance, and/or that access to refuges in the exhibit dampened the 
stress response. In Magellanic penguins (Spheniscus magellanicus) exposed repeatedly to 
simulated visits by tourists, the number of head turns, a measure of vigilance, decreased over 
time in parallel to a decrease in GC secretion (Walker, Boersma, & Wingfield, 2006), 
suggesting a closer coupling between behavioural changes and stress hormone production.  
The above studies are observational in nature, which often complicates the 
interpretation of the results given that several uncontrolled factors can influence the 
outcome of interest. A few studies used an experimental approach instead, and documented 
changes in vigilance in response to the administration of GCs like cortisol. In meerkats, 
experimental injection of cortisol did not increase vigilance behaviour (Santema, Teitel, 
Manser, Bennett, & Clutton-Brock, 2013), although it led to a decrease in feeding. Similarly, 
injection of cortisol failed to alter vigilance in Adélie penguins (Pygoscelis adeliae) on the nest 
(Thierry, Brajon, Spée, & Raclot, 2014) and in barn owl (Tyto alba) chicks (Dreiss et al., 2013). 
Because hormone levels are kept at high levels over a relatively long period, these studies can 
only address responses to rather chronic exposure. Other experimental studies showed that 
vigilance increased in animals exposed to chemicals that induce anxiety (Sapolsky & Share, 
2004) or decreased in animals exposed to calming agents (D. C. Blanchard, Griebel, & R. J. 
Blanchard, 2001; Choy, Yu, Hawkes, & Mayorov, 2012). However, the target of vigilance in 
these studies could not be pinpointed.  
Summing up, the rather conflicting results presented here suggest that some species 
might only show a response to acute predation risk (sudden apparition of a predator or 
detection of predator cues) while others mount a long-term reaction that is evidenced by a 
positive relationship between GCs and vigilance (Boonstra, 2013). But overall, the association 
between vigilance and stress hormone release is rather weak.  
 
3.1.3. Vigilance and other markers of fear 
The previous discussion focussed on one possible marker of fear, namely, the production of 
stress hormones. Given that stress hormone production is not always specific to the 
perception of risk, it is important to consider other potential physiological correlates of fear. 
Fear responses can involve several other variables. In particular, within seconds following 
the perception of a threat, a series of physiological responses come into play including 
changes in heart rate, respiratory rate, and also pupil size (Charmandari, Tsigos, & Chrousos, 
2004). These changes can be considered physiological correlates of fear at the acute level. 
In several species of birds and mammals, rapid increases in heart rate following the 
detection of a threat closely matched intense bouts of vigilance even without concomitant 
changes in physical activity (Christensen, Keeling, & Nielsen, 2005; Christensen, Malmkvist, 
Nielsen, & Keeling, 2008; Ellenberg, Mattern, & Seddon, 2013; Ely, Ward, & Bollinger, 1999; 
Holmes, Giese, & Kriwoken, 2005; Karpovich, Skinner, Mondragon, & Blundell, 2015; 
MacArthur, Johnston, & Geist, 1979), suggesting that increased vigilance and heart rate 
adjustments are correlated responses following the perception of acute risk. However, there 
are cases where rapid changes in heart rate following the perception of a threat occurred 
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without a notable change in vigilance (Ellenberg, Mattern, Seddon, & Jorquera, 2006; Giese, 
1998). It is perhaps the case that vigilance was not clearly recognized in these studies or that 
the risk was too low to alter vigilance appreciably. More generally, it should be pointed out 
that since vigilance is costly to perform, the lack of an adjustment in vigilance in response to 
a threat, which might be indicated by other markers of fear like heart rate, might indicate that 
animals cannot afford to be vigilant despite fear. This could be the case for animals who are 
very hungry or who lack access to alternative foraging areas (Gill, 2007).  
In other studies, the reverse was true in that changes in vigilance occurred following 
the detection of a threat without changes in heart rate (Christensen & Rundgren, 2008; 
Dielenberg, Carrive, & McGregor, 2001; Edgar, Paul, Harris, Penturn, & Nicol, 2012; Herskin, 
Munksgaard, & Kristensen, 2003). Similarly, domestic goats exposed to a threatening 
situation (novel person or another goat) produced many bleats suggestive of alarm and yet 
showed no changes in heart rate (Lyons & Price, 1987). These results suggest that in some 
species, vigilance or other external markers of fear can be altered without changes in heart 
rate. One possibility here is that the threat is not really a source of fear but of curiosity, which 
means that the threat should be relabelled as innocuous.  
Pupil dilation has been viewed as an indicator of increased vigilance and attention 
following the perception of a threat (Ebitz, Pearson, & Platt, 2014). Accordingly, pupil size as 
well as vigilance rapidly increased in peacocks (Pavo cristatus) exposed to a predator model 
(Yorzinski & Platt, 2014). While an increase in pupil size is thought to reduce overall visual 
acuity, it might also allow individuals to focus their attention on predator movement and high 
contrast features of the predator, thus allowing them to tune out irrelevant features (Ebitz et 
al., 2014). Typical measurements of vigilance, like those from a time budget analysis, 
emphasize the quantitative nature rather than the qualitative value of vigilance. Changes in 
pupil size could thus be viewed as an adjustment in vigilance quality in response to the 
detection of a predation threat.  
The perception of fear in humans leads to several changes in the configuration of the 
face, including eye widening and rapid eye movements, which can be interpreted as aiding 
the visual perception of threats (Susskind et al., 2008). Exposure to a predator also caused a 
decrease in blink rate in peacocks that would allow reducing the amount of time during which 
visual processing cannot be performed (Yorzinski, 2016). All these changes show that an 
acute stressor can affect not only the quantity but the quality of vigilance.  
Overall, as was the case for stress hormone release, the relationship between vigilance 
and other markers of fear is not always strong, although qualitative changes in vigilance 
during short-term exposure to risk appear to correlate well with higher predation risk.  
 
3.2. Social risk and fear 
Predators are but one source of vigilance for animals. For species who live in groups, 
conspecifics can also be an important target of vigilance. Individuals in groups face attacks or 
threats by conspecifics over food or mates. Monitoring potentially aggressive conspecifics is 
thus expected to be important to reduce the impact of aggression. The social environment of 
an individual has long been associated with the release of stress hormones (Cavigelli & 
Caruso, 2015; Creel, Dantzer, Goymann, & Rubenstein, 2013; Tamashiro, Nguyen, & Sakai, 
2005). In addition, there appears to be separate neurological pathways for fear associated 
with aggressive conspecifics and predators (Gross & Canteras, 2012). What is the evidence 
for an association between vigilance and the release of stress hormones in a social context?  
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In one monkey species, subordinates spent more time vigilant and showed higher 
levels of cortisol than more dominant group members, suggesting that being subordinate 
increased stress and that social vigilance betrayed fear of attacks (Shively, 1998). Because 
dominant group members could not really be avoided in the confined setting of the 
laboratory, it is not clear whether such results would extend to the field where individuals 
can presumably deploy more tactics to avoid aggressive encounters. Other laboratory studies 
in monkeys have also documented higher levels of cortisol in subordinates, but vigilance was 
not reported (Abbott et al., 2003; Coe, Franklin, Smith, & Levine, 1982).  
Field studies with other species confirm some of these findings. Dominant, male, 
white-faced capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus), who are vulnerable to attacks from 
outsider males, showed both elevated fGCs and higher vigilance (Schoof & Jack, 2013). During 
the reproductive season, dominant males, who are also vigilant to guard females against rival 
males from the same group, also showed the highest levels of fGCs (Schoof, Jack, & Ziegler, 
2014).  
In many species, the position of an individual in the group, whether at the centre or at 
the periphery, influences predation risk and the intensity of competition with neighbours 
(Hirsch, 2007; Krause, 1994). Indeed, individuals at the centre of their groups are buffered to 
a greater extent from predation, but often face more competition from close neighbours. 
Central individuals should thus allocate more time to social vigilance, and if stress from 
conspecifics exceeds the stress from predators, they should also show higher levels of GCs. 
Forest baboons (Papio anubis) who occupied more central positions showed higher levels of 
fGCs (Tkaczynski, MacLarnon, & Ross, 2014). However, the level of vigilance was not 
correlated with fGCs in these baboons. In other species of monkeys, males in more central 
positions also showed higher levels of fGCs, but vigilance was not noted (Mendonça-Furtado 
et al., 2014; Van Belle, Estrada, Ziegler, & Strier, 2009). However, in a previous study of one 
of these species, dominant group members maintained more vigilance (Treves, Drescher, & 
Ingrisano, 2001), suggesting a link between social vigilance and stress hormones in this 
species related to spatial position.  
High levels of GCs are not always found in subordinate group members as noted above 
in capuchin monkeys and also in other species (Creel, 2001). In groups of ring-tailed lemurs 
(Lemur catta), for instance, the highest levels of fGCs occurred in the dominant females 
(Cavigelli, Dubovick, Levash, Jolly, & Pitts, 2003). For the lower-ranking females, being 
attacked and occurring closer to one another best predicted increased levels of fGCs, which 
supports the idea that close neighbours can cause stress when they are potentially 
dangerous. In another study of the same species, dominant females showed the highest 
vigilance (Gould, Fedigan, & Rose, 1997), supporting a link between social vigilance and GC 
production.  
In one monkey species, by contrast, GC production was lowest in the more vigilant 
group members during the mate-guarding season, a period during which males invest much 
time to guard females and monitor rival males (Girard-Buttoz, Heistermann, Rahmi, Agil, 
Ahmad Fauzan, et al., 2014). Since high vigilance and mate guarding are less likely when food 
is scarce, it is perhaps the case that low GC production reflected greater food availability, 
which itself allowed more vigilance and mate guarding.  
There have been fewer studies involving taxa other than primates. In greylag geese 
(Anser anser), paired males with offspring during the reproductive season maintained more 
vigilance and showed higher levels of fGCs than paired males without offspring and unpaired 
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males (Kotrschal, Hirschenhauser, & Möstl, 1998). However, the target of vigilance could not 
be determined in this species.  
Stress hormone release can clearly be related to social factors, but it can also be 
sensitive to a host of unrelated factors such as physical exertion, disease, and food challenges 
(Cavigelli & Caruso, 2015). To isolate threats by conspecifics as a factor responsible for stress 
hormone release, it is necessary to exclude these other contributing factors. This is especially 
relevant for subordinate group members who often have less access to resources or who 
occupy peripheral positions more exposed to predation (Hirsch, 2007). In addition, 
monitoring rivals takes time, and it may follow that stress hormone release reflects a negative 
energy budget rather than fear (Girard-Buttoz, Heistermann, Rahmi, Agil, Ahmad Fauzan, et 
al., 2014).  
What could cause elevated levels of stress hormones in dominant group members, 
given that they are the ones initiating attacks? Perhaps stress comes from the fighting itself 
or the anticipation of future conflicts. Instability in the dominance structure of a group can 
also impose stress on dominant group members because aggressive encounters are more 
frequent (Setchell, Smith, Wickings, & Knapp, 2010). This suggests that stress can be in part 
a consequence of increased physical exertion. Another possibility is that by investing more 
time in vigilance to monitor neighbours, dominant group members experience a food 
shortfall, which on its own could explain the increase in stress hormone release (Girard-
Buttoz, Heistermann, Rahmi, Agil, Fauzan, et al., 2014; Surbeck, Deschner, Weltring, & 
Hohmann, 2012). In this case, it would be necessary to monitor food intake to see if vigilance 
really causes a decrease in food intake over the long-term.  
 The recognition of threats caused by other group members is so important that at least 
in primates several types of neurons are activated by subtle signs made by potentially 
aggressive individuals including gaze direction, body direction, and facial expression (Emery, 
2000). Such neurons are located in one brain area that is in direct contact with the amygdala, 
a small structure at the base of the brain. It is the amygdala that attaches an emotional 
connotation to the firing of these specialized neurons, which would trigger fear and other 
physiological consequences (M. Davis, 1992; Pellman & Kim, 2016; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 
2003).  
The amygdala has been viewed as the key area of the brain dealing with fear and 
anxiety. Electrical stimulation of different parts of the amygdala produces many of the 
physiological and behavioural consequences associated with fear such as facial expression of 
fear, elevated heart rate, corticosteroid release, and vigilance (M. Davis, 1992; Pellman & Kim, 
2016). Lesions to this structure disrupt judgments about facial features (Dal Monte, Costa, 
Noble, Murray, & Averbeck, 2015), which would make it more difficult to activate proper 
psycho-physiological reactions. The amygdala can thus be viewed as responsible for 
monitoring the environment for threats and directing the senses in acquiring further 
information (Whalen, 1998). The end result of these processes is often increased vigilance 
and a sharpening of the senses (Hermans, Henckens, Joëls, & Fernández, 2014; Shackman, 
Maxwell, McMenamin, Greischar, & Davidson, 2011) like we saw earlier with changes in pupil 
size and eye movements.  
 Oxytocin is known to attenuate responses in the amygdala, and in a recent study, 
injection of this hormone suppressed vigilance directed at other group members (Ebitz, 
Watson, & Platt, 2013), supporting the idea that the amygdala modulates the acquisition of 
information about social threats, and produces responses such as vigilance to such threats.  
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3.3. Perception of fear in others 
Solitary individuals can only rely on themselves to acquire information about possible 
threats. In group-living species, other group members can act as a source of information 
about threats. Can social animals decode information from the reaction of neighbours to 
potential threats? If neighbours can pick up information from alarmed conspecifics, then 
alarm must be associated with cues that can be used to infer fear.  
 Upon detection of a threat, many species of animals produce signals to alert others. 
Typically, these signals take the form of alarm calls, which are known to trigger an immediate 
defensive reaction in nearby companions (Blumstein & Armitage, 1997; Seyfarth, Cheney, & 
Marler, 1980). What is less known is whether more subtle cues of alarm, such as visual fright 
reactions, can also convey information about threats to others. This raises the question as to 
whether animals can recognize fearful behavioural cues (other than alarm calls) in others 
and alter their own allocation of time to vigilance in response.  
At least in humans, lesions to the amygdala increase the difficulty in recognizing 
fearful faces (Whalen, 1998). This is quite relevant because it indicates that we have the 
ability to recognize fear in others by facial expressions and direct our attention (increased 
vigilance) to discover the source of the threat. Lesions of the amygdala also make it more 
difficult to interpret faces showing surprise (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994). In 
such faces, the eyes are opened wider, which as we saw earlier might be a means of acquiring 
more visual information. The intact amygdala would recognize that eye widening betrays the 
need to acquire more information about potential threats, and initiate the same response in 
the viewing subject.  
 In apes and monkeys, who are able to some extent to modify the configuration of their 
faces, the ability to recognize fearful facial expressions has been demonstrated in many 
species (Tate et al., 2006). More recent work also shows that other species with more rigid 
facial expressions, such as sheep, can produce different facial expressions following a threat 
(Greiveldinger, Veissier, & Boissy, 2009). In addition, sheep can also distinguish between 
fearful and calm facial expressions in others (Tate et al., 2006).  
 The ability to decode facial expressions or other reactions to threats is an important 
step, but the key question is whether animals who view such displays engage in more 
vigilance in response, which would demonstrate that these reactions in others are 
interpreted as a sign of fear. The evidence is rather limited at the moment. In rats, the 
cessation of foraging by one individual (a sign of vigilance) following a threat caused an 
increase in the vigilance of a neighbour who could not see the threat directly (Pereira et al., 
2012). Similarly, female kangaroos (Macropus giganteus) who detected a snake nearby 
provided behavioural cues that induced a rapid increase in vigilance in nearby females 
prevented from seeing the snake (Pays, Beauchamp, Carter, & Goldizen, 2013). Naïve pigs 
exposed to companions who showed more vigilance and other behavioural signs in 
anticipation of a negative outcome became more vigilant themselves than when exposed to 
more relaxed companions (Reimert, Bolhuis, Kemp, & Rodenburg, 2015). By contrast, in 
chickens (Gallus gallus), signs of fear in a companion failed to elicit more vigilance in 
observers despite the fact that observers themselves reacted with increased vigilance when 
they were exposed to the threat (Edgar et al., 2012). Perhaps in this case reactions would 
have been stronger if the threat was more obviously related to predation risk or if more 
neighbours became alarmed.    
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 Another body of research shows that in many species of birds and mammals, 
individuals can synchronize their vigilance (e.g., Beauchamp, 2009; C. Li, Beauchamp, Wang, 
& Cui, 2016; Pays et al., 2007; Podgórski et al., 2016). That synchronization reflects copying 
of vigilance, rather than the independent detection of a threat by all group members, comes 
from the observation that synchronization takes place despite the lack of (obvious) external 
disturbances. It might be objected that vigilance synchronization only shows that animals 
copy the behaviour of their neighbours without necessarily copying the state of fear 
associated with that vigilance. For instance, people often eat more in the presence of others 
than when they are alone, without necessarily reporting feeling hungrier prior to the meal 
(Decastro & Brewer, 1992). Similarly, people who yawn in response to yawning by others are 
not necessarily tired (Bartholomew & Cirulli, 2014). A next step then would be to document 
rapid changes in other traits associated with fear, such as changes in heart rate or pupil 
dilation, during the synchronization of vigilance.  
 
3.4. Vigilance and the feeling of fear 
Fear as a state can be objectively measured with variables such as heart rate and the release 
of stress hormones. The feeling of fear, however, is more difficult to assess. The question of 
feeling concerns the awareness of the state of fear. No models of the optimal allocation of 
time to social or antipredator vigilance make any assumption about the feeling of fear 
(Beauchamp, 2017; Bednekoff & Lima, 2004; Lima, 1987; McNamara & Houston, 1992; 
Pulliam, 1973). Such models are concerned with the pattern of behaviour predicted to 
achieve the aim embodied in the model such as maximizing future expected reproductive 
success. Whether animals experience a feeling of fear is thus not an issue. Nevertheless, as 
we are dealing with fear, and as we know from our own experiences what fear feels like, it is 
interesting to wonder how much awareness is involved in the fear response, and ultimately 
whether other animals also experience such feelings.  
Fear could not be induced or experienced (based on self-reporting) in a human subject 
with extensive lesions of the amygdala (Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2011). 
Obviously, the difficulty is that self-reporting cannot be done with non-human subjects. 
Nevertheless, is there any indication in humans that the state of fear can be induced 
unconsciously? In one study, the amygdala responded to subliminal (undetectable visually) 
pictures of fearful faces (Jiang & He, 2006), suggesting that awareness of the threatening 
stimuli is not essential to trigger fear responses. This and other studies suggest a rapid 
pathway to the amygdala before we even become aware of the stimuli eliciting fear (Mendez-
Bertolo et al., 2016). Future studies could investigate the possibility that relevant threat 
stimuli other than fearful faces are processed similarly in humans and other species.  
It is one thing to be unaware of the threatening stimuli, but is it possible to be in a state 
of fear without consciousness of the fear itself? Humans seeing scrambled fearful faces (hard 
to recognize) showed increased responses in the amygdala and yet reported little fear 
(Whalen, 1998). The concept of unconscious emotion is quite controversial (Berridge & 
Winkielman, 2003). It would mean, for instance, that an individual allocates more time to 
vigilance after the perception of threatening stimuli (with or without awareness) and that the 
treatment of that information, leads to an observable change in behaviour but without the 
feeling of fear. Some argue that studies about the feeling of fear are best left to humans, 
although feelings of fear are not excluded a priori in non-human animals (LeDoux, 2014). The 
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point is well-taken that mechanisms that lead to vigilance through the neural pathways 




 The framework that I presented here contains the following elements. Threats, be they 
direct (an approaching predator or a threatening conspecific) or indirect (features of the 
physical and social environment of an animal associated with a higher risk) elicit reactive or 
pre-emptive vigilance along with a host of physiological reactions including rapid 
adjustments and more delayed responses (Figure 3). I sought a link between vigilance, a 
putative behavioural marker of fear, and well-established physiological correlates of fear 
such as heart rate increases and stress hormone release.  
The results are mixed: several studies reported a positive association between 
vigilance aimed at predators or at conspecifics and physiological correlates of acute or 
chronic risk, but many others documented no such association or even a negative association. 
Lack of association with other correlates of fear for both reactive and pre-emptive vigilance 
is unexpected under the hypothesis that vigilance betrays fear. Based on the findings 
reported previously, I now consider various cases for the association between vigilance and 
physiological correlates of fear, and what they imply for the question that I tackle here, 
namely, what does vigilance tell us about fear? 
 
Case 1: a threat induces an increase in vigilance with concomitant changes in at least one of 
the physiological correlates of fear. In such cases, vigilance would be a good marker of fear. 
One issue here is to ensure that the target of vigilance has been identified correctly. If the goal 
is to demonstrate that vigilance betrays fear of predation, for instance, it should be possible 
to demonstrate that vigilance was effectively aimed at predators.  
 
Case 2: a threat fails to increase vigilance despite changes in at least one of the physiological 
correlates of fear. In this case, vigilance is a poor marker of fear. The simplest explanation for 
the lack of association hinges on the sensitivity of external markers of vigilance. Vigilance 
might thus have been underestimated or misidentified. A better understanding of the sensory 
basis of vigilance behaviour in our study animals will likely increase the sensitivity of our 
measurements (Fernández-Juricic, 2012) and reduce such mismatches with physiological 
states. Another explanation is that animals are really fearful, but are unable to allocate more 
time to vigilance. This might apply, for instance, to animals who are very hungry. Changing 
hunger levels by food supplementation or measuring the level of hunger might be ways to 
investigate this hypothesis.  
 




Figure 3. Types of threats and their relationship to behavioural and physiological correlates of fear. Direct 
threats are caused by predators or conspecifics, while indirect threats are concerned with features of the habitat 
or the social settings that are associated with potential risk. These threats trigger measurable consequences at 
the behavioural and physiological levels. Two types of vigilance are distinguished: reactive (in response to a 
direct threat) and pre-emptive (in response to indirect threats). Two types of physiological responses are also 
possible: rapid (within seconds) or delayed (after a few minutes).  
 
Case 3: a threat induces an increase in vigilance but without concomitant changes in the 
physiological correlates of fear. One simple explanation for the lack of association is that 
vigilance betrays curiosity rather than fear. This could be investigated by using a different 
threatening stimulus or one that more closely matches the type of threats faced by the 
species. Another simple explanation is that the physiological correlates of fear have not been 
measured properly. If, for instance, the production of stress hormones fluctuates widely 
during the period of higher risk (Cavigelli & Caruso, 2015), more sampling might be needed 
to obtain a better estimate of the mean. Similarly, peaks in the production of stress hormones 
might be missed especially when sampling feces at irregular intervals.  
 
Under chronic exposure to stress, stress hormone release often decreases over time 
(Cyr & Romero, 2009). Stress hormone release in particular can return to low values over 
time as a result of desensitization (inability to mount a response to any threat). Here, the 
animal can be fearful and vigilant despite low levels of stress hormones or little changes in 
other physiological correlates of fear. This hypothesis can be tested by measuring the 
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physiological response of animals to a different type of threat to see if they can mount a 
response at all. 
 Another mechanism that could produce an uncoupling of vigilance and physiological 
markers of vigilance is social buffering. Social buffering refers to the beneficial effect of 
conspecifics on the recovery after the experience of stress (Kikusui, Winslow, & Mori, 2006). 
The beneficial effects tend to go in the same direction for behavioural as well as physiological 
responses to threats, but it is not always the case. As an example, monkeys exposed to a snake 
when alone showed more agitation (movements and vocalizations) than when tested in pairs, 
and yet cortisol levels remained at the same level regardless of group size (Coe et al., 1982). 
If social buffering acts more strongly on the behavioural or the physiological markers of fear, 
an uncoupling of responses is possible.  
 A final case could be made that vigilance can be triggered despite no fear, which is 
reminiscent of the idea that animals make choices to reduce predation risk without the need 
to invoke fear (Creel et al., 2009). If vigilance is viewed as a reflex following stimulation of the 
neural circuits involved in the fear response, just as uncontrollable as the increase in heart 
rate or pupil dilation, then it would seem that vigilance could not occur without fear. 
However, if vigilance can be controlled rationally to achieve the goal of reducing the risk of 
attack, vigilance could take place without the involvement of the fear circuitry at all. The open 
question is whether there is any evidence in support of this conjecture.   
  
Case 4: a threat induces no changes in vigilance as well as no changes in the physiological 
correlates of fear. If the threat is meaningful and if measurements of vigilance and of the 
physiological correlates of fear are sensitive enough, this scenario represents the worst case. 
It could be a sign that animals are desensitized after chronic stress and also unable to allocate 
more time to vigilance. Vigilance would be a poor marker of fear here as well.  
  
Another possibility is that the threat is not meaningful (low risk), in which case it is 
futile to look for an association between vigilance and physiological correlates of fear. 
Alternatively, a threat can gradually lose its ability to trigger responses over time. With 
habituation, animals exposed repeatedly to a threat that fails to bring negative outcomes 
gradually respond less to the threat over time. By contrast to desensitization, habituated 
animals retain the ability to mount a response to other types of threats, and this could be used 
to distinguish the two phenomena. There are many examples of habituation to threats both 
for vigilance (see Beauchamp, 2015, for a review) and for stress hormone release (Cyr & 
Romero, 2009). Knowledge of the history of exposure to the threat over time is necessary to 
assess this hypothesis.  
A final note concerns the existence of consistent individual patterns of responsiveness 
to stress (Boissy, 1995). Responses to stress might thus vary in a consistent manner (over 
time and contexts) in different individuals. For instance, subordinate baboons tend to show 
elevated levels of cortisol in the field, but there are subsets of subordinates characterized by 
peculiar behavioural patterns that produce cortisol at the same level as dominants (Virgin & 
Sapolsky, 1997). Because of this individual variation, cortisol levels would be more poorly 
associated with dominance status. Consistent differences in vigilance levels, with some 
individuals showing consistently high or low vigilance across contexts, have been 
documented in some species (Carter, Pays, & Goldizen, 2009; Couchoux & Cresswell, 2012; 
Dannock, Blomberg, & Goldizen, 2013; Favreau et al., 2014; Hoogland, Hale, Kirk, & Sui, 2013; 
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Mathot et al., 2011; Rieucau, Morand-Ferron, & Giraldeau, 2010; Roche & Brown, 2013), 
although this is not always the case (Pangle & Holekamp, 2010). Strong individual patterns 
of vigilance would decrease the association between fear and vigilance because vigilance is 




 In view of the above considerations, vigilance might not always be a reliable indicator 
of the state of fear. This conclusion stems from the observation that vigilance is neither a 
totally sensitive nor specific marker of the vigilance state, and that other physiological 
markers of the state of fear are neither totally sensitive nor specific to that state.  
With respect to the measurement of vigilance, a better understanding of its sensory 
basis would probably reduce the mismatch between markers of vigilance and the vigilant 
state. For example, measurements of visual acuity when animals adopt different postures can 
greatly increase our understanding of the limits of threat detection in animals and thus help 
us define vigilance more accurately (Fernández-Juricic, 2012). Vigilance carried out with 
other senses, such as ears and noses, is less likely to be influenced by postures. If vigilance 
using these other sensory modes is associated with reliable behavioural cues (e.g., sniffing or 
ear movements), it should be possible to see whether that can more accurately reflect the 
state of vigilance. Researchers can also pay more attention to the context in which vigilance 
is measured to eliminate some simple confounding factors such as hunger and habituation.  
With respect to physiological correlates of the state of fear, the researcher could also 
pay attention to the context in which these measurements are made to reduce the impact of 
habituation or desensitization. Measurements of physiological correlates of fear are less 
likely to involve these two factors in the case of acute risk responses. Known confounding 
factors, such as food stress for the production of stress hormones, should be evaluated 
carefully when assessing responses.  
Assessments of the fear state with indirect behavioural and physiological responses 
can also be improved by combining multiple responses to compensate for the relative lack of 
sensibility or specificity associated with each type of response. At some point, it might be 
relevant to ask which minimal set of behavioural and physiological correlates is needed to 
accurately pinpoint the state of fear. Other correlates of fear might also be considered in the 
future in addition to stress hormone release and heart rate. Earlier I mentioned changes in 
facial expressions and pupil size, but other simple variables could also be evaluated including 
respiration rate and body temperature (Edgar, Nicol, Pugh, & Paul, 2013; Vianna & Carrive, 
2005). With proper adjustments, one can foresee that vigilance could actually tell us a lot 
about fear.  
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Two connected theses will be defended in this paper. The first thesis is that ray-finned 
fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinopterygii; hereafter referred to simply as fishes)1 are 
sentient. The second thesis is that the pallium contributes to sentience in these species. Allen 
and Trestman (2016) equate phenomenal consciousness and sentience.  I will adapt their use 
of the term and define sentience2 as at least the minimal capacity to have subjective 
experience of the qualities associated with external and internal sensations, as well as 
affective and motivational states. The consequence of this capacity is that there is something 
that it “feels like” to be the individual, human or animal, that has subjective experience (Nagel 
1974). 
I argue that there is something it feels like to be a fish. Others disagree, and usually 
ground their disagreement on two general arguments. The first argument is that fishes lack 
the neuroanatomical substrates necessary for consciousness.  This argument assumes that a 
layered neocortex, or a structure homologous to it, with a number of anatomically distinct 
divisions and reciprocal anatomical connections among them, is required for even minimal 
sentience. Furthermore, massive reciprocal connections between the neocortex and the 
thalamus are needed. Because the fish pallium is not homologous to the mammalian 
neocortex, and its reciprocal connections with the thalamus are sparse, fishes lack the 
required neuroanatomical substrates for sentience (Cabanac et al. 2009; D. Edelman et al. 
2005; Key 2015, 2016a; Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2012; Seth et al. 2005). The second 
argument follows naturally from the first. It is that fishes do not exhibit behaviors that require 
sentience. On this view, all of the behaviors observed in fishes, regardless of how complex 
they appear to be, are explicable by reference to simple sensory–motor reflexes, species-
typical behaviors, or procedural/implicit learning and memory. I contend that both of these 
arguments fail. 
In this target article I will present research supporting the hypothesis that the fish 
brain is neuroanatomically complex enough to support sentience. I will also present evidence 
that the pallium of the fish has neurophysiological activity similar to correlates of sentience 
in mammals. Finally, I will provide selected examples of behaviors generally thought to 
require sentience in humans. 
 
2. SENTIENCE IN FISHES: THE OPTIC TECTUM 
 
Several theories propose that sentience emerged in animals when the hindbrain, 
midbrain and diencephalic nuclei first evolved (e.g., Damasio 2010; Feinberg and Mallatt 
2013, 2016; Merker 2007; Panksepp 2005). These theories differ in neuroanatomical detail 
and in the physiological and behavioral processes they emphasize. They will not be reviewed 
here (see Feinberg and Mallatt 2016, chapter 7, for a discussion). However, they have the 
following in common: (i) proposing that at least minimal sentience is possible without a 
neocortex, and (ii) attributing a role in the generation of sentience to the optic tectum. 
                                                          
1 Cartilaginous fishes, such as sharks and rays, from the class chondrichtyans are not included in this 
discussion.  
2 What I am calling sentience is, in general, the same process that Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) call sensory 
consciousness and that G. Edelman (1989) refers to as primary consciousness. 






Figure 1. The drawings in this figure are provided as aids in visualizing the physical 
relationships among the major divisions of the fish brain discussed in the text. They are 
generalized representations and may therefore deviate in detail from the specific 
descriptions given in the cited references. (A) Schematic of a longitudinal (sagittal) section of 
the fish brain. The drawing represents a parasagittal section from the location of the dashed 
line in (B). That is, it comes from a location slightly away from the midline of the brain. 
Abbreviations: Cb – cerebellum; Ha – habenula; Hy – hypothalamus; OB – olfactory bulb; OT 
– optic tectum; Th – thalamus; P – pituitary; PgC – preglomerular complex. (B) A schematic 
cross section from the dorsal through the ventral surface of one hemisphere of the fish 
telencephalon. The section is drawn to represent the approximate anterior-posterior level of 
the brain demarcated by the vertical line in (A). It shows the locations of the pallial divisions 
given by Nieuwenhuys and Meek (1990). Abbreviations (all beginning with D refer to 
divisions of the pallium): DD – dorsodorsal; DMd – dorsomedial dorsalis; DLv – dorsomedial 
ventralis; DLd – dorsolateral dorsalis; DC – dorsalis centralis; DP – dorsalis posterior; VT – 
ventral (subpallial) telencephalon; DMv – dorsomedial ventralis. 
 
 
The fish optic tectum (Figure 1A) is more involved in sensorimotor integration in 
fishes than its homolog, the superior colliculus, is in mammals. All sensory modalities present 
in any given teleost species, with the exception of olfaction, are represented in the tectum. 
However, visual input is especially strong and the tectum is generally viewed as the primary 
visual center in fishes (Feinberg and Mallatt 2013, 2016; Li 2016; Meek 1983). As such, the 
tectum is crucial for the transformation of visual input into directed, adaptive global motor 
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output. This transformation begins with the creation of an accurate point-by-point 
representation of visual space on the retina. Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) refer to this 
representation as sensory isomorphism. Retinal input to the tectum generates an isomorphic 
neural representation of visual space. Feinberg and Mallatt take it as axiomatic “that mental 
images are a part of primary, sensory consciousness and, therefore, contribute to “something 
it is like to be.) The neural representation of the world in the tectum is experienced 
subjectively as mental images. On my view, this is an important insight into what it means for 
a neural system to participate in the generation of sentience. 
 
2.1 Tectal Neuroanatomy 
 
 But what evidence is there that the optic tectum is a crucial part of such a neural 
system? Others, in particular Feinberg and Mallatt (2013, 2016) and Merker (2007), have 
provided extensive reviews of this evidence. I will not replicate these reviews, but will 
provide a brief account of data indicating that the optic tectum, and its extrinsic and intrinsic 
connections, meet the requirements to be an anatomical substrate of sentience in fishes. I will 
discuss only the visual modality, but the basic organizational pattern also applies to the other 
sensory modalities represented in the tectum. 
One requirement is that the visual world be accurately represented in the tectum. 
Isomorphic retinal input mediated by the excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate terminates 
primarily in the uppermost of the six neuronal layers of the tectum on the opposite side of 
the brain. Both anatomical and electrophysiological studies indicate that the pattern of 
termination reflects the accurate point-by-point visual representation of the world created 
on the retina (Nevin et al. 2010; Meek 1983; Venegas and Ito, 1983). Another requirement is 
modulation of the primary sensory pathways by intrinsic excitatory and inhibitory 
interneurons. Primary sensory input to the tectum can be amplified by positive feedforward 
and feedback circuits created by excitatory glutaminergic interneurons. Intrinsic inhibitory 
circuits created by interneurons that use γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) as a transmitter 
provide for temporal stabilization and spatial sharpening of activity within the excitatory 
circuits (Kardamakisa et al. 2015; Nevin et al. 2010). One function of these inhibitory circuits 
may be to improve discriminability of objects in the fish’s visual field. Ablation of these 
neurons selectively impairs prey capture in zebrafish (Del Bene et al. 2010), possibly because 
the prey is perceived as larger than it is and because predator avoidance rather than prey 
approach behavior is selected (Barker and Baier 2015). 
The tectum also receives input from mesencephalic and hindbrain nuclei, as well as 
the diencephalic and telencephalic regions, including the pallium. As will be discussed below, 
this input allows memory and emotion to influence tectal output to brainstem structures that 
regulate motor programs. The output of the tectum arises from neurons located in its deeper 
layers. This output terminates in the telencephalic, diencephalic, and brainstem sites that 
provide input to the tectum, and, most importantly, in premotor brainstem nuclei that 
directly control behavior. These nuclei send input back to the tectum, thereby providing rapid 
feedback to refine future output (Kinoshita et al. 2006; Meek 1983; Nevin et al. 2010; Sato et 
al. 2007). 
In sum, the extrinsic reciprocal neuronal connections and the intrinsic neuroanatomy 
of the teleost tectum are complex enough to support the reentrant computational processes 
proposed to underlie sentience in mammals (Crick and Koch 2003; G. Edelman 1989; G. 
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Edelman et al. 2011; Seth et al. 2005). In mammals, neural and behavioral markers of such 
computational processes are associated with the neocortex and its connections to the 
thalamus. If the conclusion reached above is correct, then it should be possible to find similar 
markers associated with the tectum of fishes. Here I will provide a specific example. 
 
2.2 Selective Attention and Tectal Neurophysiology  
 
Feinberg and Mallat (2016) include “mechanisms for selective attention to stimuli” as 
one of their criteria for sensory consciousness, the process that I am calling sentience. 
Selective attention may be a legitimate criterion for the presence of sentience, but 
researchers in this area do not agree as to how this may be. Sentience and selective attention 
are generally not considered to be the same process, and evidence indicates that either can 
be present without the other (Baars 1997; van Boxtel et al. 2010; Howe et al. 2009; Tononi 
and Koch 2015). However, it seems undeniable that the two are related. I suggest that some 
form of sentient pre-attentional awareness of the world exists as long as an adequate level of 
arousal and general, nonspecific awareness of the environment are present. However, in the 
absence of selective attention, the contents of sentience required to produce specific actions 
necessary for survival, such as finding food or avoiding a predator, are absent. On this view, 
then, selective attention varies the force and focus of sentience. The implication is that, if 
sentience did not exist, then the processes of selective attention would have no work to do. 
Therefore, they would not exist. But it is indisputable that they do. Thus, agreeing with 
Feinberg and Mallatt, I argue that selective attention is a legitimate criterion for the presence 
of sentience. 
A principal function of selective attention in the visual modality is to guide visual 
search for salient environmental items, whether these items are places of safety, a predator 
or food. In primates, visual search for salient environmental targets is conducted in either a 
parallel or serial mode (Itti and Koch 2001). The parallel mode guides attentional processes 
when the target object is distinct from surrounding distractor objects. Reaction time for 
detecting the target is very short in the parallel mode and is not lengthened by increasing the 
number of distractor objects. In this mode, the target is said to “pop-out” from the background 
distractors. Attentional processes are guided by the serial mode when the distractor items 
are similar to the target item. Increasing the number of distractors increases reaction time 
and no pop-out occurs. In primates, neocortical areas are associated with these search modes 
and consequent action selection (Bichot and Schall 2002; Li 2016).  
Ben-Tov et al. (2015) have demonstrated both parallel and serial visual search modes 
in the archer fish and have found neural correlates of these processes in the optic tectum. 
Archer fish are able to prey on insects by hitting them with water forced from their 
specialized mouths. The insect is the salient object and the fish executes a visual search to 
locate it. Ben-Tov et al. used small rectangular bars as targets and established that the 
reaction time for archer fish to shoot a bar moving either faster than, or in the opposite 
direction from, distractor bars did not change as the number of distractors increased from 4 
to 8. That is, the fish demonstrated the pop-out effect characteristic of the parallel mode of 
visual search. When the size of the bar was salient, reaction times for target selection 
increased as the number of distractors increased, indicating that the serial mode was being 
used.  
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Ben-Tov et al. identified neural correlates of pop-out in the tectum of archer fish. 
Discharge rates of tectal neurons correlated with characteristics of the selected target. 
“Speed-contrast” neurons fired at higher than baseline rates only when the speed of the target 
was salient while “direction-contrast” neurons fired at higher rates only when the target 
direction was salient. They also found “both-contrast “neurons that increased their discharge 
rates under either saliency condition.  
Ben-Tov et al. also conducted an experiment in which the target was defined by a 
combination of speed and direction. Compared to selection rates for a single target feature, a 
target differentiated by both features was significantly more likely the be selected. When 
neurophysiological responses were investigated, Ben-Tov et al. found that some of the 
neurons that increased their firing rate to a single target increased the rate significantly more 
in the presence of the additive target. 
In sum, archer fishes use the same attentional modes used by primates to construct a 
neural map of salient stimuli from a pre-attentional isomorphic neural map of the visual 
world. Both the isomorphic and salient neural structures are located in the tectum. The maps 
are dynamic and include neuronal circuits capable of associating two distinct characteristics 
of a visual stimulus (speed and direction of movement) to effectively drive a behavioral 





Several criteria have been suggested for a brain structure to qualify as a substrate of 
sentience (e.g., Crick and Koch 1990; 2003; G. Edelman 1989; Feinberg and Mallatt 2016; Seth 
et al. 2005). Each of these is a criterion for sentience, not sentience itself. One criterion is 
complexity of neural architecture and connectivity. The tectum meets this criterion. Two 
other criteria are isomorphic representation of sensory input and segregation of the sensory 
modalities. Isomorphic sensory maps are produced in the tectum. Additionally, the neural 
representation of each sensory modality is segregated from the others within the tectum. 
Another criterion is the presence of neural mechanisms for selective attention. The tectum 
has these mechanisms. The ability to merge, or bind, sensory input into a coherent image 
which can be used to direct motor output is also included. The additive effects of two distinct 
characteristics of a visual stimulus suggest that the tectum has this capacity. From this 
analysis, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the tectum is at least a part of the physical 
substrate of sentience in fishes. 
Critics of this hypothesis are likely to insist that sentience requires structures that are 
homologous to the mammalian neocortex and thalamus and to maintain that the tectum and 
its interconnections failed to meet this requirement (e.g., Key 2015, 2016a, b; Rose 2002, 
2007; Rose et al. 2012). It is also likely that critics would explain the ability of archer fish to 
discriminate between targets and distractors as some combination of reflex behavior and 
implicit discrimination learning. I admit there is room for such an argument. However, an 
explanation of the results of an experiment by Schuster et al. (2006) requires more than 
invoking implicit discrimination learning. 
Although moving targets are salient for archer fish, the ability to hit one reliably takes 
practice. Schuster et al (2006) trained archer fish to reliably hit a target 60 cm above the 
water traveling at 60 mm/s. As with the experiment by Ben-Tov et al. (2015), these results 
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can be explained in behavioristic terms. However, the results of the second part of the 
experiment by Schuster et al. does not admit of such a simple explanation. They found that a 
second group of fishes, who only observed another fish hitting a moving target, were able to 
hit the target with a high rate of accuracy on their first opportunity to do so. It is difficult to 
explain this observation without reference to the ability of the observers to form and store in 
memory a mental image of other fish successfully executing the task. This is an example of 
declarative memory, which requires conscious awareness (Cohen et al. 1997; Eichenbaum 
and Cohen 2014; Squire et al. 2015), and is, therefore, a marker for the presence of sentience. 
 The proposal that declarative memory is necessary for the ability of archer fish to 
learn from observation leads to my second thesis  that the pallium is a necessary component 
of the neural substrate for sentience in fishes. In this I diverge somewhat from the theory 
proposed by Feinberg and Mallatt (2016). Those authors do include a role in memory 
processing for the pallium in their model but they do not grant the pallium any place in the 
generation of mental images. Rather, the pallium simply modulates motor commands issued 
by the tectum (Feinberg and Mallatt 2016, Kindle edition, location 2580). I argue below that 
the pallium has a more central role in the formation of mental images — and, hence, in 
sentience in fishes — than simple modulation of tectal processing. 
 
3. SENTIENCE IN FISHES: PALLIAL ANATOMY 
 
3.1 Overview of Sensory-Specific Connections 
 
The teleost pallium receives a variety of modality-specific sensory inputs (Giassi et al. 
2012b; Ito and Yamamoto 2009; Northcutt 2006; Yamamoto and Ito 2008). As in mammals, 
all sensory modalities in fishes, other than olfaction, reach the pallium through a subpallial 
relay. Unlike mammals, the primary sensory relay is not the thalamus. The thalamus does 
contribute input to the teleost pallium (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Ito et al. 1986), but the 
diencephalic preglomerular complex (PgC; Figure 1B) — a component of what Mueller 
(2012) named the “wider thalamus” — is the principal source of its monosynaptic sensory 
input (Demski 2013; Giassi et al. 2012b; Mueller 2012; Northcutt 2006; Yamamoto and Ito 
2008). The PgC receives topographically organized input from the tectum (Giassi et al. 2012a; 
Northcutt 2006) and its output to the pallium maintains modality segregation. Recognizing 
this, Ito and Yamamoto (2009) concluded that: “Ascending pathways mediated by the 
preglomerular complex enumerated above exhibit a considerable degree of modality-specific 
organization similarly to mammalian thalamocortical pathways” (p. 117). For example, visual 
input terminates most heavily in the dorsal lateral pallium (DLd/DLv in Figure 1). Indeed, the 
DLd has been proposed as the visual pallium for many teleosts (Demski 2013; Saidel et al. 
2001). Cell clusters in different parts of the DM receive auditory, gustatory, and lateral line 
input (Demski 2013; Northcutt 2006; Prechtl et al. 2008). In some species, the DD receives 
some sensory input, but its major connections are with the other pallial divisions.  
The DC receives comparatively little subpallial input but has reciprocal connections 
with other pallial divisions and is the major source of pallial output to the tectum, the PgC, 
and numerous other subpallial sensory-motor structures (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Giassi et 
al. 2011; Giassi et al. 2012b, c; Ito et al. 1986; Murakami et al. 1983).  Therefore, the large 
neurons in the DC can affect motor programs or modulate sensory input to other pallial 
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divisions through its connections to the diencephalic and midbrain motor and sensory 
processing sites. 
 
3.2 Non-Specific, Modulatory Pallial Inputs 
 
In addition to the qualities associated with sensory input from the environment, 
sentience includes subjective feelings associated with motivational and affective states such 
as hunger, thirst and fear. These states are supported not by sensory-specific input from 
subcortical structures, but by subcortical input that terminates throughout the cortex (Purvis 
et al. 2011). In mammals, these systems are associated with the cholinergic, dopaminergic, 
GABAergic, serotonergic, and noradrenergic neurotransmitter systems. The same 
neurotransmitter systems are found in fishes (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Giassi et al. 2012b, 
c; Giraldez-Perez et al. 2013; Mueller and Guo 2009; Murakami et al. 1983; Schweitzer et al. 
2012). The presence of dopaminergic and serotonergic input suggests that motivational and 
affectual systems found in mammals also exist in fishes. These neurotransmitters are 
involved in guiding approach and avoidance behaviors (e.g., Dayan 2012). Feinberg and 
Mallatt (2016) rightly include the feeling states associated with these behaviors in what they 
call sensory consciousness and what I am calling sentience. The existence of these 
neurotransmitter systems in fishes provides additional support for sentience in teleosts. 
Additionally, cholinergic, noradrenergic and serotonergic afferents to the cortex affect 
memory, attentional processes, and states of consciousness (e.g., awake or asleep, dream 
sleep or non-dream sleep) in mammals (Richerson et al. 2012). The presence of widespread 
input containing these neurotransmitters from subpallial structures, particularly the 
midbrain and hypothalamus, to the pallium suggests the existence of common modulatory 
mechanisms for these functions in fishes and mammals.  
 
3.3 Excitatory and Inhibitory Connections of the Pallial Divisions 
 
Research from Leonard Maler’s laboratory at the University of Ottawa (Elliot et al., 
2017; Giassi et al. 2012 a, b, c; Trinh et al. 2015) exploring the pallium of two species of weakly 
electric knifefish has confirmed the gross pattern of intrapallial connections observed in 
other teleost species (Echteler and Saidel 1981; Ito and Yamamoto, 2009; Northcutt, 2006), 
and has added important details. Excitatory neurons are required for positive feedforward 
and feedback control of local circuits. Inhibitory neurons are necessary for temporal 
stabilization and spatial sharpening of activity within these circuits. 
Using immunocytochemical markers and localized injections of neurotracers, Giassi 
et al. (2012b, c) described the circuitry created by excitatory glutaminergic neurons. The DL 
has reciprocal excitatory connections to the DD, thus permitting feedforward/feedback 
excitation between the DL and DD. The DC receives excitatory glutaminergic input from the 
DL. Similar to what has been found in other species, the knifefish DC is the principal source 
of excitatory pallial output to diencephalic, midbrain and hindbrain targets, each of which 
returns excitatory input to the DL. These three regions of the fish pallium therefor have 
circuits that can support reentrant processing, one of the proposed requirements for a 
neurobiological substrate of sentience (e.g., Crick and Koch 2003; G. Edelman 1989; G. 
Edelman et al. 2011). 
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Mueller and Guo (2009) observed presumptive inhibitory GABAergic neurons in the 
DL, DD, DM and DC in zebrafish. Giassi et al. (2012a, c) confirmed this observation in knifefish.  
Giassi et al. (2012c) also observed rich intrinsic GABAergic plexuses and numerous 
GABAergic terminals, particularly in the DL. The source of some of this GABAergic 
innervation is the telencephalic subpallium (Elliot et al. 2017; Giassi et al. 2012c; VT in Figure 
1B) which, in turn, receives excitatory glutaminergic input from the DM (Gaissi et al. 2012b, 
c). Whether the source is intrinsic or extrinsic, GABAergic terminals within the DL, DM and 
DD modulate the activity of excitatory glutaminergic neurons (R. Vargas et al. 2012). 
 
3.4 Pallial Layers and Cryptic Columns in the DL 
 
Giassi et al. (2012c) investigated the extrinsic connections of the DL and the other 
pallial divisions of the knifefish. In order to study the intrinsic connections of the DL, Trinh et 
al. (2015) incubated slices of the pallia from knifefish in nutritive media. They located the DL 
in the slice and used a microscope to guide injections of axonal tracers into discrete parts of 
it. Analysis of the resulting data indicated that the trajectory of the intrinsic axons arising 
from some of the large neurons within the DL separate it into 60-µm-thick lamina along its 
horizontal axis. Axons from other large neurons have projections extending 100 to 150 µm. 
These projections delineate columns along the vertical axis. Each column connects 
reciprocally to adjacent columns creating local recurrent networks throughout the DL. Thus, 
the DL of the knifefish pallium exhibits both a layered and a columnar organization.  
 Such a neuronal organization is characteristic of the mammalian cortex, but Trinh et 
al. (2015) emphasize that the columns observed in knifefish are not structurally discrete in 
the same way as columns in regions of the mammalian neocortex, such as the somatosensory 
cortex. Rather, they resemble the overlapping cryptic ocular dominance columns found in the 
visual cortex (e.g., Kaskan et al. 2007). Cryptic columnar organization allows small changes 
in input to one column to cause a slight shift in neuronal activity in overlapping columns, 
thereby allowing spatiotemporal integration of sensory input and binding. 
 
3.5 Fish Pallial Anatomy: Summary 
 
The research reviewed above indicates that the fish pallium has reciprocal 
connections with subcortical structures that provide it with both specific sensory and non-
specific modulatory input. The specific sensory input to the pallium arises primarily from the 
PgC and is analogous to the reentrant network between the thalamus and cortex in mammals 
which has been proposed to correlate with conscious experience of environmental stimuli. 
The non-specific input comes from ventral telencephalic, diencephalic and brainstem nuclei, 
and contains neurotransmitters associated with affective and motivational states in 
mammals. My conclusion is that the teleost pallium has the neuroanatomical complexity 
necessary to contribute to sentience. In the next section, I will give evidence that the pallium 
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4. SENTIENCE IN FISHES: PALLIAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 
 
4.1 Pallial Rhythmic Electrical Activity 
 
There are few relevant neurophysiological experiments, and they were not specifically 
designed to evaluate the pallium for correlates of sentience. However, their results suggest 
the fish pallium exhibits generalized electrophysiological responses correlated with several 
criteria of sentience in mammals. For example, recordings of the electroencephalograms 
from the skulls of Atlantic salmon (E. Lambooji et al., 2010), African catfish (E. Lambooji et al. 
2006) and the turbot (B. Lambooji et al. 2015) demonstrated that the pallium of the fish 
generates electrical activity in the delta (0.5–4 Hz), theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8–14 Hz), beta 
(14–30 Hz) and gamma (30 Hz and higher) bandwidths. The same spectrum of EEG 
frequencies is generated by the mammalian cortex and correlates with levels of arousal and, 
at the gamma frequency, with attentional processes and possibly with sensory binding. 
(Baars et al. 2013; Crick and Koch 1990; 2003; Edelman 2003; Orpwood 2013; Tononi and 
Edelman 1998). In addition to generalized electrophysiological responses similar to those 
found in the mammalian cortex, the teleost pallium shows modality-specific, sense-evoked 
responses (Prechtl et al. 2008; Elliot and Maier 2015). 
 
4.2 Sensory-Evoked Activity 
 
Prechtl et al. (1998) recorded evoked action potentials from the pallial neurons of 
weakly electric elephant nose fish in response to auditory, visual, mechanical (water 
movement), lateral line and electrical field stimulation. The electrical field stimulation was 
not noxious, but intended to mimic stimulation produced by the fish itself, or by conspecifics. 
In accord with the anatomical data described above, responses to visual stimuli were 
observed predominantly in the lateral pallium. Responses to electrical stimuli also occurred 
more laterally in the pallium, but were clustered toward its posterior (toward the tail) pole. 
Mechanical-stimuli-evoked responses mostly from neurons located ventromedial to the area 
where responses to electrical stimuli predominated and auditory-evoked responses were 
predominantly found in the anterior medial pallium. It is interesting that Prechtl et al. also 
observed that the sensory stimuli used in their study produced field potentials that oscillated 
in bandwidths from 15 to 55 Hz. The higher end of these bandwidths corresponds to the 
gamma frequency proposed, as noted previously, to be the neurobiological signature of 
attentional processes and sensory binding. 
I indicated above that the primary interconnectivity of the DD is with other pallial 
divisions. Using electric brown ghost knifefish, Elliot and Maler (2015) made extracellular 
and patch-clamp recordings from DD neurons in response to electrosensory or acoustic 
stimulation. Extracellular recording revealed that DD neurons exhibited sustained discharge 
to electrosensory stimulation. It is interesting that the onset latency for DD neurons to 
respond to electrosensory stimulation was substantially longer than that found for medial 
pallial neurons to respond in the study by Prechtl et al. (1998). This finding is compatible 
with the anatomical data that indicate the DD does not receive significant direct sensory 
input, but adds further processing to sensory input to the DL and DM. Patch-clamp recordings 
indicated that the membrane potential for DD neurons went from the persistent “down” state 
of approximately -70 mV to an “up” state of approximately -45 mV in response to 
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electrosensory stimulation. The shift to a smaller negative membrane voltage indicates an 
increase in neuronal excitability, and these responses correlated with the frequency of 
extracellular spiking. Acoustic stimulation produced similar effects. In interpreting these 
results, Elliot and Maler (2015) hypothesized that “Up states are induced by complex and 
variable pallial network activity that intervenes between sensory input and DD cells” (p. 
2075). The results of this experiment suggest that the DD may be involved in longer-term 
cognitive processing of input to other pallial divisions and can be taken as support for the 
proposal that the DD serves as an association region, thereby expanding the regional 
complexity of the pallium. 
 
4.3 Fish Pallial Neurophysiology: Summary 
 
Neurophysiological studies show that neurons in the fish pallium generate the same 
spectrum of EEG frequencies and waveforms observed in mammals. Pallial neurons also 
respond to sensory stimulation with specific evoked responses that show some segregation 
by sensory modality. Sensory stimulation also evokes EEG activity in the gamma bandwidth, 
a presumed correlate of attentional processes and sensory binding. Additionally, 
electrophysiological data support the hypothesis, generated from anatomical data, that a part 
of the pallium, the DD, possibly serves an associative function. These electrophysiological 
data are consistent with the hypothesis that the fish pallium contributes to the production of 
sentience in fishes. 
 
5. THE PALLIUM AND BEHAVIORAL MARKERS OF SENTIENCE 
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss experiments that link behavior of fishes to 
both the pallium and sentience. I will not discuss the substantial body of behavioral research 
that is supportive of my thesis that fishes are sentient because most of it was not designed to 
evaluate the role of the pallium in behavior. Additionally, much of it has been reviewed in 
recent publications (Allen 2013; Balcombe 2016; Braithwaite 2010; Brown 2014, 2016; 
Brown et al. 2011; Sneddon 2015). 
Two general categories of behavior have dominated the published literature 
concerned with the behavioral functions of the fish pallium. The reason for this dominance 
stems from the anatomical, developmental, and molecular research that points to the medial 
pallium (DM – DMd and DMv in Figure 1B) of fishes as a homolog to the mammalian 
amygdala, and to the lateral pallium (DL – DLd/DLv) as a homolog to the mammalian 
hippocampus (Ganz et al. 2015; Harvey-Girard et al. 2012; Nieuwenhuys and Meek 1990; 
Northcutt 2006). These homologies led to the hypothesis that lesions of the DM or DL would 
have the same behavioral effects as lesions of the amygdala or hippocampus in mammals.  
Research generated primarily by researchers at the Universidad de Sevilla has largely 
supported this hypothesis (Portovella et al 2004a, b; Vargas et al. 2006; 2012). 
 
5.1 Avoidance Behavior and the Pallium 
 
As indicated earlier, I follow Allen and Trestman (2016) and define sentience broadly 
as the ability to have any subjective experience. This definition differs from that of Feinberg 
and Mallatt (2016) who regard sentience as the affective component of sensory 
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consciousness. Despite this definitional disagreement, I agree with their requirement that 
“for an animal to be ‘sentient’ it must be capable of experiencing an affective state” (Feinberg 
and Mallatt 2016, Kindle location 3055). 
Lesions of the DM impair learned behaviors motivated by aversive stimuli in the same 
way that destruction of the amygdala does in mammals (Davis 1992). For example, Portavella 
et al. (2004a, b) assessed the effects of either DM or DL lesions on the ability of goldfish to 
learn a shuttle-box avoidance task. A shuttle box has two compartments. The fish had to learn 
to swim from one box to the other in response to presentation of a colored light (the 
conditioned stimulus, CS) in order to avoid electrical shock (the unconditioned stimulus, US). 
Portavella et al. found that DM lesions had no effect on escape from electrical shock, but 
significantly impaired learning of the avoidance response to the CS. DL lesions had no effect. 
These results support the hypotheses that integrity of the DM is necessary for 
successful performance of a learned, aversively-motivated behavior and that it is a homolog 
of the amygdala. However, whether sentience is required to explain the acquisition of shuttle-
box avoidance can be questioned. The answer to this question depends on interpretation of 
the two-process theory usually used to explain shuttle-box avoidance learning (Mowrer 
1960). The first process is classical conditioning. The CS produces a conditioned emotional 
response after repeated association with the innate aversive emotional response produced 
by the US. The second process is operant conditioning. On one interpretation, the innate and 
conditioned emotional responses are equated to experience of fear. Reinforcement occurs 
when the avoidance response reduces fear (Mowrer 1960). Several publications describing a 
variety of other procedures to assess avoidance behavior in intact members of several species 
of fish support this view (e.g., Braithwaite 2010; Braithwaite and Boulcott 2007). If fear is 
considered to be a consciously experienced state, then the ability of fishes to learn shuttle-
box avoidance supports the hypothesis that they are sentient. Under this interpretation, the 
DM is part of a distributed neural system that generates the feeling of fear. Subpallial 
structures comprise the core of this system, and, in conjunction with the DM, participate in 
elaboration of the negative affectual component of sentience in fishes.  
 
5.2 Declarative Memory and the Pallium 
 
Declarative memory in humans and other mammals is associated with availability for 
conscious recollection and provides flexible guidance to behavior in different contexts. 
Behaviors that require relational learning among stimuli distributed either over time or in 
space are considered to be exemplars of declarative memory. Transitive inference (TI) 
provides an excellent example (Cohen et al. 1997; Eichenbaum and Cohen 2014). TI is the 
ability to infer a relationship between items that have not been previously directly compared. 
First observing that A<B, B<C, and C<D, and then deducing that A<D is an example of TI. In 
humans TI requires conscious awareness of the relationships (Smith and Squire 2005). Thus, 
the presence of TI in a non-human species can be taken as an indication that the species is 
sentient. 
Grosenick et al. (2007) demonstrated that male cichlid fish (Astatotiliapia burtoni) 
exhibit TI in an observational learning situation. Male A. burtoni inevitably fight for territory. 
A bystander male (BM) was placed in the center of an arena surrounded by five small 
compartments (A through E) with transparent walls. Each compartment housed a combatant 
fish (CF). CF B was introduced into CF A’s compartment, then CF C into CF B’s, and so on. Each 
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invader lost the ensuing fight. For example, CF A beat CF B and CF D beat CF E. CF A and CF E 
were then placed in separate transparent chambers and the time the BM spent near each fish 
was recorded. This was repeated for CF B and CF D. Although CF A had not fought with CF E, 
nor CF B with CF D, the BMs consistently spent more time in the vicinity of the losers (B and 
E) than they did in the vicinity of winners. This is a clear indication of TI and supports the 
hypothesis that fish are sentient. 
Destruction of the hippocampus significantly impairs behaviors associated with 
declarative memory (Eichenbaum and Cohen 2014; Squire et al. 2015) including TI (Smith 
and Squire 2005). Because the DL of fishes is considered to be the homolog of the 
hippocampus, lesions of the DL should disrupt behaviors associated with declarative memory 
in fishes. The effects of DL lesions on TI in fishes have not been demonstrated, although it is 
a testable hypothesis that DL lesions would impair TI in archer fishes. However, other 
behaviors requiring relational learning have been identified in fishes (Gerlai 2017), and the 
effect of DL lesions on some of these has been demonstrated. 
Declarative memory is distinguished from procedural or implicit memory which is 
unconscious and is characterized by inflexible stimulus response associations. Classical 
conditioning is regarded as a characteristic example of procedural memory. It is dependent 
upon the integrity of the cerebellum regardless of the temporal relationship between the CS 
and the US (Christian and Thompson 2003). The hippocampus is not required for procedural 
memory, including classical conditioning, except under a specific experimental design known 
as “trace” conditioning. In the trace procedure, the US is turned on at some time after the CS 
been turned off. Thus, the term “trace” refers to the assumption that there must be some trace 
of the CS remaining to relate it to the US across the temporal gap between the offset of the CS 
and the onset of the US. This procedure differs from the “delay” procedure in which the US 
comes on while the CS is still present. Hippocampal destruction in humans and other 
mammals has no effect on conditioning in the delay procedure (Christian and Thompson 
2003). Nor does destruction of the DL in the goldfish impair classical conditioning when the 
delay procedure is used (Gómez et al. 2016; Rodríguez-Expósito et al. 2017). 
However, hippocampal destruction does impair acquisition of classical conditioning 
when the trace procedure is employed in both mammals (Weiss et al. 2015) and goldfish 
(Gómez et al. 2016; Rodríguez-Expósito 2017). These results do not mean that the cerebellum 
is not important in trace conditioning, as cerebellar destruction impairs trace conditioning in 
both mammals and fish. They are, however, interpreted to indicate that the hippocampus (or 
DL in fishes) functions in concert with the cerebellum in trace conditioning to enable 
declarative memory — and thus conscious awareness — to form a conscious image from 
memory to relate the CS and US across the temporal gap. 
The same effect has been reported for shuttle-box avoidance learning by Portavella et 
al. (2004a). As described above, while DM lesions impaired shuttle-box avoidance learning, 
DL lesions had no effect when the delay procedure was used. However, when a trace 
procedure in which there was a five-second delay between the offset of the CS in the onset of 
the US was used, both DM and DL lesions impaired shuttle-box avoidance learning. These 
results are compatible with research in humans indicating that trace conditioning involves 
conscious awareness (Clark and Squire 1998) and hence give some support to the hypothesis 
that fish are sentient. 
In addition to TI, Eichenbaum (2000) considers allocentric spatial learning to be a 
clear indication of the presence of declarative memory in animals. Allocentric spatial learning 
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refers to the ability of a person or animal to encode and organize the memory system for 
spatial information based on the physical relationships of objects as part of a distant scene 
independent of the subject’s position relative to those objects. A large number of teleost 
species demonstrate allocentric spatial learning (e.g., Brown 2014; Durán et al. 2010; Creson 
et al. 2003; White and Brown 2015). The mammalian hippocampus is associated with 
allocentric spatial processing (Nadel 1991). The following evidence indicates that the DL is 
associated with spatial learning in fish.  
Hippocampal neurons in rats show place-related increases in the firing rate, and 
hippocampal lesions impair allocentric spatial learning in rats (Nadel 1991). DL neurons in 
freely swimming goldfish and cichlid fish show place-related increases in the firing rate 
(Canfield and Mizumori 2004), and Uceda et al. (2015) observed spatial-learning-related 
increases in metabolic activity in the goldfish ventral DLv. Furthermore, a series of 
experiments from the Seville group indicate that lesions of the entire DL (e.g., Durán et al. 
2010; J. Vargas et al. 2006), or just to the DLv (Bingman et al. 2017), impair allocentric spatial 
learning in goldfish. DM lesions, on the other hand, have no effect on allocentric spatial 
learning (Durán et al. 2010; J. Vargas et al. 2006).  
 
5.3 The Pallium and Behavior: Summary 
 
In this section I have described the results of experiments which indicate a double 
dissociation between the behavioral effects of DM and DL lesions. DL lesions impair behavior 
only when the task demands that a relationship among stimuli be maintained across time or 
in space. I argue that this implicates the DL in declarative memory which by general 
consensus implies conscious awareness. DM lesions, on the other hand, impair behaviors 
generally associated with procedural memory which does not require conscious awareness. 
However, even here, the DM may be involved in the affective component of sentience if the 
two-process theory of shuttle-box learning is interpreted to involve a subjective sense of fear. 
Particularly for the DM, the function of these pallial structures in the modulation of behavior 
is part of a network that includes core subpallial structures. However, I argue that the DL 
plays an important role in the generation of mental images, and thereby sentience, when 
declarative memory is required for successful execution of motor programs that are 




In this target article, I have argued that fish are sentient. As indicated above, this 
argument has been cogently made by others based on the complexity of brainstem circuitry 
(e.g., Feinberg and Mallatt 2013, 2016; Merker 2007), and the flexibility and complexity of 
the behavior of fishes (e.g., Balcombe 2016; Braithwaite 2010; Brown 2014; Brown et al. 
2011). I have also argued that the intrinsic neuroanatomical organization and extrinsic 
connections of the pallium, particularly with the PgC and the tectum, are complex enough to 
be at least weakly analogous to the circuitry of the cortex and thalamus assumed by some to 
underlie sentience in mammals. Neurophysiological and behavioral data further support the 
hypothesis that fish have the capacity for sentience.  
Based on the evidence reviewed in this paper, I suggest that the pallium is an 
important part of the hierarchical network proposed by Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) to 
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underlie sentience in fishes. The tectum is at the core of this network. The tectum receives 
segregated sensory input and has the local and global reentrant neural circuitry needed to 
amplify and process this input. Segregation of the sensory modalities is maintained through 
the PgC to the pallium. The pallium also receives input from subpallial structures involved in 
placing a positive or negative valence on this input. These inputs are then integrated by 
various divisions of the pallium. Particularly in the case of the DL and declarative memory, 
the result of this integration is the formation of mental images that permit relational 
interactions among stimuli and flexible regulation of behaviors organized in the brainstem.  
In her book Animal Minds, Andrews (2015) makes the point that, “Members of the 
human species have human minds, and if members of other species have minds, they will 
have species-specific minds of their own” (p. 4). It is safe to say the same about those 
processes of the mind of fishes I call sentience. Fish sentience differs from human sentience, 
and what it feels like is as unknowable to us as what it feels like to be a bat. However, just as 
Nagel (1974) found it reasonable for there to be something it feels like to be a bat, I think that 
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